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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL ) 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FARMERS INSURANCE [ 
EXCHANGE, \ Case 
Defendant and Third-Party No. 11350 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
-vs.-
CARL R. SESSIONS, 
Third-Party Def end ant 
and Respondent. 
RESP'ONDENT''S BRIEF 
S'l1A'lEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff and re-
spondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, to 
recover from the defendant and appellant, Farmers In-
~unmee Exchange, the sum of $676.18 under the provi-
~io11s of a subrogation agreement contained in the State 
Parm\; policy with its insured. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO"\VER COURT 
After the plaintiff's complaint had been filrd, de-
fendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim against de-
fendant upon which relief could be granted assertiug-
that subrogation did not lie> for medical pay. This mo-
tion was denied by Judge Wilkins in the Distriet Court 
of Salt Lake County. The plaintiff then filed a motion 
for summary judgment which was heard by Judge Croft, 
and the motion for summary judgment was granted for 
the sum of $676.18, interest and costs of court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the trial court's judgment 
affirmed. 
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court revernr• 
the lower court's summary judgment in plaintiff's favor 
and to dismiss plaintiff's action on the ground that as a 
matter of law, there exists no right of subrogation. In 
the alternative appellant has requested the court to re-
mand the case to the trial court to determine the factunl 
question of whether defendant had notice of plaintiff's 
right of subrogation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Compan)·, 
agrees with the statement of facts as set forth by ap-
pellant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, except for the fol-
2 
lo\\·iu~ additional facts which respondent deems impor-
taut in connection with the proper presentation of the 
case. 
rl1he Record discloses (R. 5) that Farmers Insurance 
K-.:clwnge wrote a letter to State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company elated October 19, 1967, advising State Farm 
::IIutual Insurance Company that they were in receipt of 
lhr subrogation demand for both medical pay and prop-
('rty damage and enclosed with the letter a check for 
$'727.87 ~which was the demand of State Farm Mutual In-
q1rance Company for the automobile damage except for 
the deductible, but denying the medical pay subroga-
iion claim 011 the basis that subrogation would not lie. 
The respondent further alleged in its complaint that 
notice had been given (R. 3) of the subrogation interest 
of Rtde Farm Mutual Insurance Company and the pay-
ment or anticipated payment of the property damage and 
tliP medical bills which was admitted by appellant (R 11) 
awl Farmers Insurance Exchange further admitted 
U1ci payment to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 
of th0 property damage subrogation claim and the mail-
ing of a letter dated October 19, 1967, attached to re-
spondent's complaint (R. 5). 
Notice of the subrogation claim for the property 
damage and medical pay was given and acknowledged 
nt the same time and in the same communications (Ex-
l1ihit D-2, R. 5). The insured of State Farm Mutual In-
-:m·,: tt('C Company was also giYen notice of the subroga-
3 
tion rights of State Farm Mutual Insurance Companr 
and of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company's notir~ 
to Farmers Insurance Exchange of State Farm Mutirnl 
Insurance Company's subrogation rights. (Exhibit p 1 
and D-2). 
By letter dated February 19, 1968, appellant's coun. 
sel in a letter to Judge Wilkins acknowledged they had 
received evidence of notice and that it was 110 longer 
an issue (R. 54). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NO'r COMMIT ER-
ROR IN RULING THAT A RIGHT OF SUBRO-
GATION EXISTS ON BEHALF OF PLAIN-
TIFF, STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANm~ 
COMP ANY, AND IN GRANTING A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF FOR THE 
MEDICAL BILLS rrHE PLAINTIFF PAID ON 
BEHALF OF ITS INSURED. 
In No. 4 of Vol. 4, of the Utah Law Review, 1955, 
there is an article on Assignment of Tort Actions. Thi' 
article was written before the Survivorship Statute W8' 
enacted in 1967, but it indicates the trend of the Utah 
Court prior to that time. 1.V e quote from that article at 
page 549, as follows : 
Assignment of tort claims has been the subject of 
very little attention on the part of writers a1~d 
scholars. There is relatively little case law :n 
this country dealing with such assignments. It is 
not then very astonishing to learn that Utah haF 
but little law on the subject and that the scatten·d 
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cases do not synthesize readily into clear general 
rules. 
However, some few observations which may 
throw light on the fate of future assignments of 
tort claims in this state may be made. Foremost 
among these is the recognition, both generally and 
in Utah, that the arguments against assignment 
which seemed overwhelming to the common law 
judges have lost most of their persuasive force 
today. Maintenance and champerty are no lon-
ger dreaded as the termites which will eat out the 
foundation of the legal system or flood the courts 
·with torrents of ill-founded and unnecessary liti-
gation. 
That torts are "personal" to the parties involved 
is no longer a weighty idea. The very general 
trend toward survivorship of tort claims has 
shown convincingly that most tort claims can be 
tried between the tort f easor and someone other 
than the original plaintiff. Perhaps this is the 
foundation of the general norm which determines 
·whether a claim is assignable by asking whether 
or not it survives. It has been suggested that the 
increasing scope of survival statutes will, through 
operation of this norm, eventually make tort ac-
tions as assignable as contract actions are today. 
It is interesting to notice that Utah has identified 
with this norm. It is even more interesting to ob~ 
serve, however, that the Utah court has sustained 
certain assignments of tort claims without noting 
the existence of survival statutes which were at 
least relevant and at most controlling, if that 
norm is the only one. It appears to this writer 
that the Utah court wisely has not permitted the 
Rurviva1 norm to control its thinking. It is often 
Raid that actions which survive have been as-
Rigned by operation of law. But it does not fol-
low that ev~ry action w!1ich survives should ip~r; 
facto be assignable; assignment and snniYa] ;m 
not convertible terms. 
It is some advance to he liberated from the 8nr. ' 
vival test. It is extremely difficult, howewr, tn 
frame another general standard for determinatio11 
of assignability. The modern English view that 
tort claims which have the character of or are i 
akin to property interests are assignable ha8 a . 
good deal of appeal, and the Utah court has eri-
dently been influenced by this notion, notably in 
the rescission cases discussed above. But the ~lan­
gers of a raigid "property" test have been dem. 
onstrated in the experience of equity's rule that it 
protects only property interests: Such thingR as 
news of daily events and membership in social or-
ganizations and religious groups have been called 
"property" in order to justify obviously nem-
sary intervention of equity courts. 
Probably the most that can presently be said is 
that the scope of assignahility is certain to ex-
pand further; that the Utah court has been in 
the trend of expansion, as shown by the fact that 
no Utah case has refused validity to an assigll-
ment of a tort claim, and that none of the Utah 
cases have reached a wrong or undesirable rr-
sult. * * * 
Utah now has a survival statute pertaining to per-
sonal injuries which was enacted by the 1967 Legislature. 
This is Section 78-11-12 which provides as follows: 
Causes of action arising out of physical injury to 
the person or death, caused by the wrongful ad 
or negligence of another shall not abate upon Ow 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person, ''.nd 
the injured person or the personal representat1w 
or heirs of one meeting death as aboYe stated 
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shall have a cause of action except for claims re-
lating to pain and suffering against the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer; provided, how-
e1'er, that the injured person or the personal rep-
resentatives or heirs of one meeting death shall 
not recover judgment except upon some competent 
satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of 
said injured person. 
Respondent aclrnowledges a conflict in the authori-
ties in the variom: states on the right of subrogation in 
the case of medical bills but takes the position that the 
modern trend and the weight of authority, particularly 
of the more recent cases, authorizes subrogation for med-
i('al pay claims. 
The question as to an insurer's supbrogation rights 
tmder a medical payment subrogation clause in an auto-
mobile iusurance policy may arise in a variety of ways: 
(1) An insurer who has made medical payments pursuant 
to the policy may attempt to recover them directly from 
llte tort feasor; (2) An insurer claiming the right to re-
imbursement may attempt to recover them back from 
thr insured after the latter has settled with or recov-
1·r<'cl n judgment against the tort feasor; ( 3) An insured 
may attempt to recover medical payments from an in-
::ll!'er ·which refuses to pay them unless and until the 
i11snred executes a formal agreement subrogating the 
insured to the proceeds of any recovery which the in-
'lll'ed may obtain: ( 4) An insured may bring an action 
to rec(1ver medical payments from an insurer which flatly 
r0fuse~ Lo make them because the insured has already 
;r·1tlt>d with and released the tort feasor and has thereby 
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prejudiced the insured 's subrogation right; and ( 5) One 
insurer claiming a right to subrogation may attempt to 
recover the medic?J payments made to its insured from 
the insure·r of the tort f easor after the first insurer has 
given the tort feasor's insurer notice of its subrogation 
and the tort feasor's insurer thereafter makes settlement 
with the insured of the first insurer. 
The case before this court comes under the fifth 
group of cases set forth above, but the principles an-
nounced in all of the cases are applicable to determine 
the question as to whether or not subrogation will lie. 
In a few cases cited in appellant's brief the court~ 
obserYing that a claim for personal injuries is not assign-
able, have held that subrogation of an insurer pursuant 
to medical payments provision clause will not be allo\\'cd 
where it amounts to an attempted assignment of a claim 
for personal injuries. Appellant cited cases in the states 
of Missouri and one in Arizona and also one n Califor-
nia. The California case of Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co., 34 Cal. Rep. 41 (1963) is not applicahh· 
because California had a specific statute against assign-
ment at that time. 
On the other hand, the courts in several cases aJl(l 
several states have recognized the insured 's right to hr 
subrogated pursuant to such a policy provision. Re-
spondent will set forth herein cases in the states of 
Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, Illinois, New York. 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Michigan, North Carolina. 
Wisconsin and Minnesota which have allowed suhrogll 
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-
iiou of medical payments. In some of these cases the 
courts have based such a holding on the ground that a 
claim for personal injuries may properly be assigned. 
[11 other cases, however, the courts, although recogniz-
ing that a personal injury claim is not assignable, have 
hrld that the medical payments subrogation clause in 
question did not constitute an assignment of a claim for 
p0rsonal injuries, but merely impressed a lien in favor of 
the insurer to the extent of its payments. 19 ALR 3rd 
1055. 
Iu the case of Davenport, et al. v. State Farm Mu-
tual, et al., (1965, Nev.), 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10, State 
Fnrrn l\lutual Insurance Company brought an action 
against Allstate and their insured to recover the sum 
of $1,000.00 paid cut on medical bills under the medical 
pay coverage of their policy. The policy of State Farm 
Mutual in the Davenport case contains the same subro-
g·ation provision as the policy in the case now before the 
Utah court. 
State Farm Mutual had previously put Allstate In-
Htuance Company, the tort f easor 's carrier, on notice of 
tl1e payment and their subrogation rights. Thereafter 
Allstate settled with State Farm Mutual's insured for 
tl1e snm of $8,000.00. Allstate ignored the subrogation 
letters from State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. 
1'l1c lower court held State Farm Mutual Insurance Com-
pan? was entitled to recover and the Supreme Court of 
N ('\·nrla affirmed. 
9 
Nevada has a statute, Nevada Revised States, 41-100 
which provides for survival of causes of action for per-
sonal injury. This statute states that a claim may be 
prosecuted as would a cause of action for damages to 
personal property no matter whether a plaintiff or de-
fendant died. The Nevada Court said: 
It is now quite generally accepted that assigna 
bility of the right to sue in tort for personal injur-
ies is governed by the test of survivorship. That 
is if the right of action surviYes the death of the 
injured person, that right is assignable. 
This case is actually on all fours with the case now be-
fore the Utah Court. 
The Nevada Court stated: 
If the $8,000.00 payment was meant to include the 
claimant's medical expenses, hvo drafts should 
have been issued, one for those expenses payable 
to the Handleys and State Farm jointly and the 
other for the balance payable to the Handleys 
alone. However, our lack of knowledge in this 
respect is not significant, for one fact is estab-
lished. Settlement was made without regard to 
the known subrogation or lien right of State 
Farm. We hold that, where the medical payment 
clause of an automobile insurance policy subro-
gates the company to the extent of the medi('al 
payments made by it to the insured, to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement that may result from the 
exercise of any rights of recovery 1-vhich the in-
jured person receiving such payment may hare 
against any person, the tort f easor or his insur-
ance carrier may not disregard that known snli 
rogation or lien right in settling his liability. 
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Ju an action by an insurer against a third party tort 
f•_·asor to recover the amount of the medical payments 
tlrnt it liacl paid to the insured ''there the plaintiff alleged 
tl1nt it was subrog·ated to medical payments made by it 
to the iusurecl and that the insured executed a subroga-
tion agreement whereby she assigned the claim against 
t]1C' rlcfondant third party tort feasor to plaintiff, the 
ronrt in Tracelrrs Insura1Jice Co. v. Lutz (1964, Ohio), 
~10 N.E. 2d 755, overruling defendant's demurrer held 
that the law of Ohio appeared to be relatively clear to the 
dfrct that all courts will honor an assignment to a subro-
g-atccl insurance company of a part of a cause of action 
11risi11g from a tortious injury, and that, therefore, the 
snhrogation clause in question was valid. The court said 
that if au irnmred and an insurance company wish to 
enter into an agreement, whereby the insurance com-
pany is subrogated to said medical payments, it is im-
pr!ssible to see why this is an unfair or an improper re-
~nlt, aucl if this can be done with reference to property 
(lamagc paymeuts, which the courts of Ohio construe as 
~pl it ting a cause of action, it certainly can be done for 
ill<'(lical payments, which likewise is splitting a cause 
uf action. 
The court further observed that the superintendent 
of i11<.;11ra11('e of the State of Ohio has full authority to 
<ll'n~· a claim to any companies ,vi10 fail to comply with 
hi.~ orders and that there was no claim on the part of 
1!1c rld<•ndant that the superintendent had intervened or 
Li b'11 any action to pren'nt the type of policy set forth 
'" 1d;1i11tiff's petition. Normally, said the court, parties 
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are free to contract as they desire, and the court can see 
nothing against public policy in holding that medical 
payments can be matters of subrogation as well as prop 
erty damage payments. 
In another Ohio case Travelers Indemnity Co. r. 
Godfrey (1967), 230 N.E. 2d 560, the plaintiff insurer 
brought an action against defendant for property darn. 
ages and medical expenses which it claimed to have paid 
growing out of an automobile accident in which defend-
i 
ant was alleged to have been negligent in the operation · 
of his automobile, which negligence resulted in a collisi011 
with an automobile owned by the insured, one Smith. In 
one cause of action the plaintiff sought to recover for 
medical expenses paid to the Smiths for injuries received 
by the daughter, a passenger in the car, and in another 
cause of action sought to recover for medical expensr1 
paid to a Mr. and Mrs. Sciarini, parents of another minor 
in the same vehicle. In its petition, plaintiff claimed 
that under its policy of insurance and by assignment of 
the parties involved it became subrogated to the rights 
of its insured to such hospital and medical expenses. 
There was evidence that the Sciarini girl had brought a 
separate action against defendant tort feasor and that 
this action had been settled and dismissed. 
Overruling defendant's demurrer, the court said 
that the present doctrine in Ohio and other jurisdic-
tions seemed to be that a subroga.ted insurance company 
is entitled to sue in its own name for the part of a claim 
for damages arising out of an accident which has been 
assigned to it under a subrogation agreement, and that 
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this is tme whether it is a subrogated right for property 
damage or for hospital and medical expenses. 
The court also said that Smith, if he had not made 
<111 assignment of his rights to the plaintiff, would have 
a separate cause of action against the defendant for prop-
Prty damage to his automobile and for medical expenses 
whieh he was obligated to pay for his minor daughter, 
independent of other claims, and that 1~fr. and Mrs. Scia-
rini, likewise, would have a cause of action against the 
rlef endant for medical expenses which they were obli-
gated to pay for their minor daughter, independent of 
~aid minor daughter's claim for personal injury, and that 
the settlement of the daughter's claim could not affect 
their right to rec8ver for such expenses. 
Although recognizing that a claim for personal in-
jnries is not assignable, the courts in some cases have 
taken the view that the medical payments subrogation 
clause did not constitute an assignment of a claim for 
penwnal injuries, but merely impressed a lien upon the 
proceeds of any recovery obtained by the insured from 
the tort feasor. In De Cespedes v. Prudence Mutual Cas-
ualty Cu., (Fla., 1966), 193 So.2d 224, affirmed, 202 So.2d 
j61, plaintiffs whose automobile was involved in an acci-
dent with another automobile owned and operated by a 
third party tort f easor, not a party to the present action, 
arlmitted to having settled their claims against said tort 
f<'nsor, and to having executed releases, and in the pres-
Put action sought to recover a second time for their medi-
1'<il expenses under the medical payments provision of 
thPir automobile insurance policy. That policy con-
13 
tainecl a subrogation clause that "in the event of am 
payment under this policy, the company slrnll be ~uJ, 
rogate<l to all the insured 's rights to recO\'ery therefor, 
against any person or organization and the insured shall 
execute and deliver instruments and papers ancl do "·hai 
ever else is necessary to secure such rights. The insured 
shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such right:;," 
(Same as State F'arm Mutual 's policy.) 
Affirming the trial court, which had granted a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, the court held that ai1 
insured was not entitled to a recovery under the me<licai 
provision of an automobile poliey containing the abore 
subrogation clause after he had settled his claim again>t 
a third-party tort feasor and executed a full release. 1'he 
court rejected plaintiff's argument that the subrogatioll 
clause amounted to an attempt to assign a claim for 
personal injuries, such au assignment being invalid un-
der the common law and not expressly sanctioned by 
statute. The court said that the eoncept of subrogation 
is distinct from that of a mere assignment, and that 
subrogation is a creature of equity having for its purpose 
the working out of an equitable adjustment between thr 
parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt hy 
the person who in equity and good conscinence ought 
to pay it. Under the doctrine of subrogation, said tl1f' 
court, the insurer is "substituted" by operation of lmr, 
to the rights of the insured, whereas, by contrast, an as-
signment generally refers to or connotes a voluntary act 
of "transferring" an interest. Subrogation serves to 
limit the chance of double recovery or windfall to tlj(' 
insured, the court eontinued, and when exercised, teud~ 
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to plaC'e tlw primary liability upon the tort feasor, where 
it lielc!ngs and, cm1cluded, the court, so long as subroga-
i io11, ns a pp lied to this medical pay provision, serves to 
bar de. uh le recovery, it should he upheld. 
'l11Jis was a Supreme Court decision of Florida. The 
Jfo:1rid Appellate Courts in Florida in the case of Mary-
/a11rl Casualty Co. v. Plant, (Mar., 1968), C.C.H. Auto-
mohilt> Law Reporter on Insurance, Case No. 5864, at p. 
/013 and Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Birch (Fla., 
1%7), 196 So.2d 482, 202 So. 2d 561, followed the decision 
of the De Cespedes case. 
In the case of Bernardini v. Home and Auto Insur-
u11cc ('o. (1965, Ill.), 212 N.E.2d 499, an action was filed 
liy tlw automobile liability insureds to recover reason-
able medical expenses incurred by them as a result of an 
automobile collision. At the time of the collision, plain-
tiffs were covered Ly a policy of insurance issued by the 
1kfemla11t which provided for the payment of all reason-
able mPdical expenses incurred within one year from the 
ilah, of an accident, and which also contained an express 
medical subrogation clause and a clause requiring the 
r·oo1wra ti on of the insured in re la ti on thereto. Plaintiffs 
rlfrdpJ a settlement through the insurer of the third-
party tort feasor and executed a general release in favor 
of the tort f easor, whereupon defendant refused to pay 
the· medical bills incurred by the plaintiff, claiming that 
tlic· plaintiffs prejudiced the defendant's subrogation 
rig-lits contained in the policy. The trial court rendered 
in!lgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that the medi-
":tl t1ulirogatio11 clause was an assignment of a personal 
15 
tort and thus void as against public policy. Upon appcat 
the court, reversing, sustained defendant's contentions 
that the clause granted the well recognized right of 8ub 
rogation to recovery from a third party tort foasor of 
payments made to reimburse the insured for me<lica! 
expenses caused by the tort feasor, that the medicRI 
subrogation clause in the insurance contract was not 311 
assignment of a personal tort and that when the in. 
sured executed the general release, in favor of the thir(] 
party tort feasor, the insured was precluded from re. 
covering from the insurance carrier, because he harl 
prejudiced any and all rights which the carrier may han 
had by virtue of the subrogation provision. Observing 
that both parties to the controversy recognized that i11 
Illinois causes of action for personal torts are not as· 
signable, the court said that it, nevertheless, agreed with 
the dofendant that in the instant case the record did not 
show an assignment of a personal tort. The court sai1l 
that subrogation operates only to secure contribution aml 
indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole 
claim, and in the instant case the medical subrogation 
clause did not purport to transfer or assign the entire 
claim of plaintiffs against the tort feasor, but rather im 
pressed a lien in favor of the insurer, to the extent of ib 
payment, upon any recovery obtained by plaintiffs from 
the tort f easor, the court observing that suhrogation diil 
not deprive the insured of the recovery for paiu a!lll 
suffering. 
Again in Illinois where a medical payments insurerl 
settled his claim for personal injuries ·with the tort fea8or 
aud executed a general release, and then brought an 
action to recover medical payments from the insurer 
nuder an automobile liability policy which contained a 
clause that in the event of any medical payments the in-
surer would be subrogated to all the rights of recovery 
which the insured person had against the tort feasor, 
and provided further that the insured should do nothing 
after loss to prejudice the insurer's rights, the court in 
Damhesel v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance 
r'o. (Ill. 1965), 209 N.E.2d 876, affirming a judgment 
\rhich granted defendant's motion for judgment on the 
plea<liugs, rejected plaintiff's contention that the sub-
rogation clause was void as against public policy because 
it constituted an assignment of a personal tort and also 
because it was against public policy to permit subroga-
tion in a non-indemnity type of· insurance policy. The 
court said that it was clear that the subrogation clause 
of the policy did not constitute an assignment of a per-
Wllal tort, observing that subrogation presupposes an 
nf'tual payment and satisfaction of the debt or claim to 
which the parties subrogated, although the remedy is 
kept alive in equity for the benefit of the one who made 
the payment under circumstances entitling him to con-
trihution or indemnity, while an assignment necessarily 
contemplates the continued existence of the debt or claim 
assigned. In the case at bar, said the court, the contract 
1Jf iHsurance clearly looked to subrogation rather than 
assignment of a tort; the insurance company would have 
pairl the amount due the plaintiff, thus satisfying his 
rlaim, and the insurer would then have sought contribu-
tiou from the tort feasor, who was ultimately liable. Con-
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eluding, the court held that it was clear that tlw poli('y 
in question was one of indemnity and that the amom1t 
to be paid under the contract would depend on the amonut 
spent by the insured for the proper care of his injuries. 
The subrogation provision of the policy involved i11 
the Damhesel case is the same standard provisio11 <'OH· 
tained in State Farm .l\Iutual Insurance Company's pol. 
icy now before the court. 
The Tennessee cases of Wilson v. Tennessee Farmn, 
M11t11al Insurance Co. (1966), 411 S.W.2d 699, and TP11-
nessee Farmers Insura~ice Co. v. Rader, (1966), 410 
S."\V.2d 177, folloY,Ted the same line of reasoning as th1· ', 
Illinois decisions in holding that the medical subrogation 
clause of an automobile liability policy which did not plll'-
port to assign or transfer the entire claim of the polir) 
holder against the tort feasor but which merely secured 
contribution and indemnity to the extent of the medical 
payment made to the insured was valid ancl enforceahlr 
and not contrary to the law prohibiting the assigllmrnt 
of a personal injury claim. 
Jn an action to recover under a m<'dical payment' 
policy, where the e'Tidence showed that plaintiff insured 
was injured, when her automobile collicfod with mwthcr. 
that she settled her claim against the clrin'r of the otl1t·r 
car and gave him a general release, mid that she then <k-
mam1ed $3,2GO.OO from defendant insurer for h0r mctli 
cal expenses, but that defendant refused to ywy it 011 
the ground that she had recovere<l the sum from tlH' tnrl 
feasor and had destroyed th<:> right of subrogation r1· 
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sen·cd to defendant by the policy, the court in Bush v. 
]{0111c Jusurance Co. (1967, N. J.), 234 A.2d 250, affirm-
ing a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, 
rejcckd plaintiff's contention that to allow medical pay-
me11ts subrogation violates the principle against assign-
ing· a personal injury claim, and violates a principle 
against splitting a cause of action. The court said that 
an as:-;ignment is a transfer by action of the transferor 
whereas subrogation is an equitable right which arises 
out of the facts and which entitles the subrogee to collect 
that ~which he has advanced. The court also said the 
plain1 iff 's contention that permitting subrogation for 
medical payments may cause many practical difficulties, 
rspccially where payment is made by the insurer and 
then the insured makes, or seeks to make, a compromise 
settlement with the tort feasor, could be answered (1) 
By pointing out that no such difficulty existed here and 
(~) By observing that the question of whether a provi-
sion for subrogation should not be permitted in a policy 
hcranse it is impractical or unfair is for the commission-
l'l' of banking and insurance to decide. 
In Miller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 
(1965, N. Y.), 264 N. Y. Supp.2d 319, plaintiff brought 
n rleclaratory judgment action to declare invalid the 
"subrogation" portion of his automobile insurance policy 
as it applied to medical payments and to declare invalid 
two trusts receipts exacted of him by the defendant, his 
insurance carrier, as a condition of his claim for medi-
l'al expenses. There was evidence that the automobile 
liuhility insurance policy in question contained a medical 
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payments clause which provided that in the event of any 
payment the company would be subrogated to all the 
rights of recovery therefor which the injured person may 
have against any person causing the injury. The plain , 
tiff incurred medical expenses as a result of injuries 1 
sustained in an automobile accident and thereafter exe 
cuted trust receipts to the defendant after being told 
that his claim would not be paid unless he did so. Plain-
tiff subsequently brought an action for personal iujurie~ ' 
against the tort feasor, which was afterward settled. DP- I 
fendant claimed a lien for the medical expenses paid to 
plaintiff by it and notified the tort feasor 's insurance 
carrier of its claim, but that carrier chose to ignore th~ I 
claim and paid plaintiff the full settlement. Granting a I 
judgment for defendant, the court declared: ( 1) The 1 
subrogation provision in question was not an assignment I 
of all or a part of a claim for personal injuries; (2) The 
subrogation provision created an equitable lien by subro-
gation against any recovery by the assured from a third 
party; (3) The trust receipts in question were valid anrl 
proper and under the terms of the policy their exaetioll 
by the insurer as a condition to the payment of the claim 
to plaintiff for medical expenses was not improper, in-
valid, or illegal; and ( 4) The trust receipts ·were Yalid 
and made plaintiff a trustee only to the extent that he 
received any proceeds of that portion of his claim arising 
out of medical expenses for which he had received reim-
bursement from the insurer. 
In an action to recover medical payments under au 
automobile liability policy, where the evidence showed 
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tlrnt plaintiffs had brought suit against the driver of the 
other automobile involved in the accident and that settle-
mc11t was reached and both were paid in settlement of 
their claims, and that although defendant insurer was 
duly notified of the accident and of the fact that both 
plaintiffs were injured and would present their claims 
under the medical payment plan, the defendant insisted 
that it would not pay until the necessary subrogation in-
'trnments were executed as provided for in the policy, 
the court in Demery v. Na#onal Union. Fire Insurance 
('o. (1967, Pa.) 232 A.2d 21 affirming a judgment on the 
pleadings for the defendant insurer, held that the sub-
rogation clause and the policy here in question was valid 
ancl enforceable and that plaintiff had by their own act 
made it impossible for them to comply with its terms, 
and that thus, the plaintiffs being unable to execute the 
subrogation agreement, judgment must be entered 
against them and in favor of the defendant. The court 
reYicwed a number of cases which had considered the 
question as to the validity of such subrogation provisions 
of medical payment clauses, and said that it believed that 
the better reasoning was contained in the cases in which 
the f'mbrogation clause was held to be valid, and that a 
more equitable result would be reached if it followed 
this reasoning, the court stating that the reasoning in 
more modern decisions made a clear distinction between 
an assignment of a tort claim and subrogation of medical 
payments under a contract. 
In the North Carolina case of Anderson v. Allstate 
Insurance Co. (1966), 145 S.E.2d 845, the Allstate Insur-
ance Company issued its automobile policy providing 
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medical payments coverage subject to a limit of $2,000.00 
to Anderson. rrhe National Grange 1\1 utual Insuranci· 
Company issued its automobile policy providing medical 
payments coverage subject to a limit of $1,000.00 to Ber-
nett, and providing that National would be subrog-ated 
to all rights of recovery which the injured person might 
have against others. The Allstate policy had no suci 1 
subrogation provision but provided that its medical pay. 
ments coverage with respect to a non-o-wned automobile 
was excess of other valid and collectible medical pay- . 
ments insurance. 
Anderson was riding as a passenger in Bernett'.' 
automobile when it collided with a vehicle driven h1 
Graham, whose negligence caused the collision. Ander-
son was fatally injured and the funeral expenses were 
$1,373.25. Anderson's widow, as administratrix of his 
estate, settled the claim against Graham and then brought 
action against the Allstate Insurance Company to re 
cover the funeral expenses under the medical payment> 
coverage of the Allstate policy. The Allstate Insnrancc 
Company, contending that its coverage was excess of the 
Nation's policy, filed a cross-action against National. ~a­
tional Insurance Company denied coverage because of 
the release given to Graham which clefoatPcl National's 
subrogation rights. The trial court held that, at the tirnl' 
of the accideut, the National 's policy provi(led medical 
payments coverage and that the Allstate's policy ·was rx-
cess, so that Allstate was liable only for the amount of 
the funeral expenses in excess of $1,000.00. The atl-
ministra trix appealed from the judgment to that effect. 
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The Supreme Court found no error holding (1) That 
' whc1 her 1 he National policy provided "other valid and 
rollectihle insurance" must be determined as of the time 
of the collision and (2) That the destruction of her claim 
ag-ai11st National by the administratrix in releasing the 
ncgli~e11t driver did not enlarge her rights against All-
state. 
In the case of Michigan Medical Service v. Sharpe, 
(:"llich. 19;}4), 64 N.W.2d 713, the plaintiff insurance com-
pany furnished the defendant insured certificate hold-
ers with medical and surgical service under the terms of 
a certificate which contained an express subrogation 
clause which provided that the subscriber and his de-
pendents should eY-ecute and deliver such assignments of 
claim or other papers as might be necessary to secure 
plaintiff's right against the tort feasor. The court held 
such clause binding on the subscriber and his depend-
ents who accepted benefits under the certificate, the rec-
onl containing no suggestion that the agreement was 
i11uuced hy mistake, overreaching, fraud, or misrepresen-
tation, and there being no ambiguity between the sub-
rogation clause and the other terms of the certificate, 
the court said it couldn't agree with the defendant's 
contention that such clause gave the plaintiff no rights, 
because to do so would be to read it out of the agree-
mtnt by rendering it meaningless, which a court may 
not do. As against further contentions of the defendant, 
the court stated that enrichment of the plaintiff is not 
unjust if pursuant to the express agreement of the par-
tiPs fairly and honestly arrived at before hand, nor is 
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it unjust, unfair, or inequitable to give effect to an agret-
ment which was not induced by mistake, overreaching, 
fraud, or misrepresentation. 
In Na.tional Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Grimei 
(Minn., Sept., 1967), 153 N.vV.2d 152, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that an insured under the stand. 
ard provisions of an automobile insurance policy prr 
taining to medical pay insurance was liable to his insur-
ance company for the amount it had paid to him under 
the medical pay provisions of the policy after he exe-
cuted a general release in favor of the tort feasor's in-
surance carrier who paid him the sum of $3,500.00 in . 
exchange for a general release releasing all claims he had 
against the tort f easor. 
In the case of Associated Hospital Services, Inc., v. 
Milwaukee Auto Insurance Company, (Wisc., 1967), 14i 
N.W.2d 225, an action was filed by the insured to recowr 
medical payments made to its insured follovving an acci-
dent. The action was against the liability insurer of the 
tort f easor. The court granted summary judgment for 
the plaintiff's medical insurer against the defendant lia-
bility insurer which was affirmed on appeal. The Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff was eutitled to sub-
rogation rights under the contract of insurance. In this 
case the plaintiff was a non-profit organization, Blur 
Cross. The defendant had settled with plaintiff's insurPd 
for all claims and taken a general release. The plaintiff 
sued the defendant insurance company and obtained a 
judgment. 
24 
In summary, it is clear that the great weight of au-
thority among the various states which have had the 
~uestion presented to them has held the right of 
subrogation to be valid and enforceable either on the 
hasis that a personal injury action is assignable or that a 
subrogation provision does not constitute an assignment 
of a personal injury action but only a right of agree-
mrnt and indemnity which has been approved by the 
hanking and insurance commissioner and that there is 
nothing with respect to public policy that should make 
the agreement invalid or unenforceable. 
Other cases have pointed out that the insurance com-
missioner approved the provisions for subrogation and 
that it is presumed that in approving the policy the com-
missioner has also taken into consideration the fact that 
the reduced premium may be authorized by reason of the 
subrogation provisions of the policy. Other courts have 
stated that subrogation is an equitable right which arises 
out of the facts and entitles the subrogee to collect that 
which he has advanced, and the question of whether a 
provision for subrogation should or should not be per-
mitted in a policy because impractical or unfair is for 
the commissioner of banking and insurance to decide. 
In one case it was stated that subrogation is merely 
a creature of equity to forestall a windfall for the wrong-
rloer where the insured has obtained and paid for the 
expense of procuring insurance for his protection and 
at the same time serves to limit the chance of double re-
co\'ery or windfall to the insured. When exercised, it 
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tends to place the pnmary liability on the tort feaRrii 
where it belongs. 
Our state statute contemplates the principle of sub 
rogation insofar as insurance companies are conrernr·rl. 
and we, therefore, submit that in consideration of all tbr 
principles involved subrogation should be Yalid anrl 011. 
forceable. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT COl\11\fIT ERROR n 
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF STATE FARJI 
HAD GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE TO DE 
FENDANT F ARl\IERS OF ITS SUBROG.\. 
TION INTEREST PRIOR TO DEFFJNDANT'S 
SETTLEMENT WITH THE INSURED SES-
SIONS. 
The trial court, as a matter of fad, in its findings o! 
fact and conclusions of law found that notice had hm 
given to the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, of 
plaintiff's subrogation interest prior to the time settle 
ment was made between Farmers Insurance Excha11~1 • 
and the State Farm Mutual insured, Carl R. Sessio11R and 
that Farmers had receiYecl such notice. The followiut 
facts supported the trial court's conclusion in that fl'· 
gard: (1) The letter of August 4, putting Farmers ln· 
surauce Exchange on notice of the subrogation interc~I 
of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. rrhis notice 
·was both as to medical pay and property damage suhro 
ga tion. ( 2) Farmers Insurance Exchange then "'ent onl 
and settled the claim of State Farm Mutual 's insnrrd i1I1' 1 
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took a general release. (3) Thereafter they paid the 
property damage subrogation claim of State Farm Mu-
t1rnl 's without objection or complaint about lack of notice 
hut with respect to the medical pay subrogation claim 
merely denied it on the ground that it was not a recov-
erable item under the laws of the State of Utah. They 
ncwr did diHpute notice until the time of the summary 
judgment. The notice with respect to medical pay and 
property damage was all given at the same time, and if 
they had notice of the property damage claim when they 
discm;sed the matter of settlement with State Farm Mu-
tual 's insured, then certainly they had notice of the med-
ical pay claim and could have discussed that with him, 
also. ( 4) The question of notice was raised at the time 
of the argument on defendant's motion to dismiss be-
l'ause plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of 
nction 1 and plaintiff's counsel thereafter furnished cop-
il'~ of the letters to defendant's counsel and he apparent-
ly made contact with his company and thereafter wrote 
a letter to the court stating that the matter of notice was 
no 1011grr an issue. 
The letters in evidence plus the admitted conduct of 
the def en<lant, Farmers InP-urance Exchange, therefore, 
r:o11clusively established that they had notice of the actual 
payment of the medical bills as well as the property dam-
agr claim at the time they went out and made their set-
tlrment. The insured of State Farm Mutual had also 
hePJ1 sent a letter notifying him of State Farm's subro-
gation claim and it appears clear to this writer that the 
dt·fp11daut had actual notice of the subrogation interest 
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of State Farm Mutual on both medical pay and the prop 
erty damage claim at the time settlement was made. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment granted by the trial couri 
sustaining subrogation contracts in the state of Utan 
for medical payments should be sustained and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. L. SUMl\IERHA YS of 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for\Respondent 1 
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